The achievement of constitutionalism in Asia: moving beyond 'constitutions without constitutionalism' by Chen, AHY
Title The achievement of constitutionalism in Asia: moving beyond
'constitutions without constitutionalism'
Author(s) Chen, AHY
Citation
The achievement of constitutionalism in Asia: moving beyond
'constitutions without constitutionalism'. In Chen, AHY (Ed.),
Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century, p. 1-
32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014
Issued Date 2014
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/201920
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2569058 
1 
 
The Achievement of Constitutionalism in Asia: Moving Beyond 
“Constitutions without Constitutionalism” 
 
Albert H.Y. Chen  
 
 The phrase “constitutions without constitutionalism” has been used by various 
authors to describe the state of constitutional law in Africa, the Middle East and Latin 
America at various points in time.1 For significant periods, the constitutional 
circumstances of many Asian countries may also be aptly summarised by 
“constitutions without constitutionalism”. Just as in the daily life of individuals, it is 
relatively easy to say something or make a promise, but more difficult to translate 
what is said or promised into action and reality, so in the political and legal life of 
nations, it is relatively easy to make a constitution, but more difficult to put it into 
practice, to implement it and be governed by it – which is what “constitutionalism” is 
about. There is therefore nothing surprising about the phenomenon or “syndrome” of 
“constitutions without constitutionalism”, particularly in developing countries to 
which Western ideas, theories and institutions of constitutionalism have been 
transplanted in the course of the last two centuries.  
 As it is by no means obvious or likely that a nation’s constitution will be 
successfully put into practice after it has been enacted, it is indeed right and 
appropriate to talk of constitutionalism as an “achievement”. After identifying what he 
calls the five “functional characteristics” of constitutionalism, Grimm suggests that 
“If all these elements are present, we speak of the achievement of constitutionalism.”2 
He elaborates: 
“Constitutionalism … deserves to be called an achievement, because it rules out 
any absolute or arbitrary power of men over men. By submitting all government 
action to rules, it makes the use of public power predictable … It provides a 
consensual basis for persons and groups with different ideas and interests to resolve 
their disputes in a civilized manner. And it enables a peaceful transition of power to 
be made. Under favourable conditions it can even contribute to the integration of a 
                                                   
1 See generally H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an 
African political paradox’, in Douglas Greenberg et al. (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy: 
Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 65; Atilio A. 
Borón, ‘Latin America: Constitutionalism and the political traditions of liberalism and socialism’, in 
Greenberg et al. (eds.), ibid., p. 339; Nathan J. Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2002); Asem Khalil, ‘From constitutions to 
constitutionalism in Arab states: Beyond paradox to opportunity’ (2010) 1(3) Transnational Legal 
Theory 421.  
2 Dieter Grimm, ‘Types of constitutions’, in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 98 at 104 
(emphasis in original). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2569058 
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society. … [C]onstitutionalism … is not an ideal type in the Weberian sense that 
allows only an approximation, but can never be completely reached. It is a 
historical reality that was in principle already fully developed by the first 
constitutions in North America and France and fulfilled its promise in a number of 
countries that had adopted constitutions in this sense.”3  
 Although Grimm notes that constitutionalism is more than a mere ideal type, and 
stresses that “Constitutions that show all the characteristics of achievement did exist 
in history and do exist today”,4 I believe it is fair to say that even in the early 
twenty-first century, constitutionalism is still a work in progress in many parts of the 
world, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Many Third World countries 
have still not grown out of the syndrome of “constitutions without constitutionalism”; 
the “achievement” of constitutionalism is yet to come. Just as Fuller speaks of the 
project of legality or Rule of Law as being governed by a “morality of aspiration”,5 
which means whether the ideal of the Rule of Law is realised in a particular country 
or legal system is a matter of degree, and the practitioner of the morality of aspiration 
should try her best to achieve excellence in, or a higher degree of fulfilment of, this 
ideal, so this “morality of aspiration” is also applicable to the practice of 
constitutionalism. The achievement of constitutionalism in a particular nation-state (or 
in the international order, insofar as the idea of global or transnational 
constitutionalism is valid6) is also a matter of degree.  
 The present book project attempts to inquire into the state of constitutionalism in 
Asia in the early twenty-first century, or the extent or degree to which 
constitutionalism has been “achieved” in this part of the world at the present time. 
Although constitutionalism as a theory and practice of government and law first 
originated in Western Europe and North America, there is by now considerable 
evidence of its positive reception in and successful “transplant” to a significant 
number of Asian countries. As I wrote previously, “A macrohistorical perspective, 
covering developments in Asia since the late nineteenth century, suggests that 
constitutionalism has broadened and deepened its reach, significantly, over the course 
                                                   
3 Dieter Grimm, ‘The achievement of constitutionalism and its prospects in a changed world’, in Petra 
Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
p. 3 at 10. 
4 Grimm, ‘Types of constitutions’, p. 105. 
5 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 5. The 
morality of aspiration is concerned with the striving to achieve a particular good that can be realised in 
different degrees. The higher the degree to which the good is achieved, the more successful and 
excellent is the moral project concerned. 
6 See, e.g., Nicholas Tsagourias (ed.), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman 
(eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘The end of constitutionalism as we know it? 
Boundaries and the state of global constitutional (dis)ordering’ (2010) 1 (3) Transnational Legal 
Theory 329.   
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of time.”7 The experience of different Asian countries in this regard provides useful 
and fascinating case studies of what Grimm calls the “achievement of 
constitutionalism”.  
For example, post-War Japan and India are cases of stable and relatively 
successful practice of constitutionalism in Asia for more than half a century. South 
Korea and Taiwan, two of the “Four Little Dragons” of East Asia, are cases of 
successful democratic transitions since the 1980s from authoritarian developmental 
states into liberal constitutional democracies, where democratic consolidation was still 
in progress in the early twenty-first century. The Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and 
Indonesia, which have also undergone democratic transitions at various points in time 
since the 1980s, are developing countries in the process of building constitutional 
democracy of a higher quality. Constitutional courts now exist in Taiwan, South 
Korea, Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia (as well as Mongolia which is not covered 
by this volume), and have achieved varying degrees of success.8 The cases of 
Singapore and Malaysia have posed the question of whether there exist peculiarly 
“Asian” values that shape conceptions of human rights and constitutionalism in Asia.9 
Nepal provides an example of a most recent and still ongoing enterprise of 
constitution-making in Asia. Myanmar provides an example of a most recent and still 
ongoing exercise in transition from military government to constitutional rule. In the 
People’s Republic of China, Vietnam and North Korea, one-party states still exist that 
seem to contradict the trends of constitutionalisation, judicialisation and 
democratisation in their neighbours, though movements towards the Rule of Law and 
improved legal protection of rights have taken place in China and Vietnam.10 In 
China’s Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong (as well as Macau, which is not 
covered by this volume), the constitutional experiment of “One Country, Two Systems” 
has unfolded. These, then, are the Asian countries and jurisdictions discussed in this 
book.  
 This introductory chapter consists of two main parts. Part I attempts to develop a 
conceptual framework for the purpose of studying, analyzing and evaluating 
constitutional, political and legal developments in countries on their path towards the 
“achievement of constitutionalism”. Part II discusses the experience of Asian 
countries and jurisdictions from a historical and comparative perspective, utilising the 
                                                   
7 Albert H.Y. Chen, ‘Pathways of Western liberal constitutional development in Asia: A comparative 
study of five major nations’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 849 at 884. 
8 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Björn Dressel (ed.), The Judicialization of Politics in 
Asia (London: Routledge, 2012).  
9 See, e.g., Albert H.Y. Chen, ‘Conclusion: Comparative reflections on human rights in Asia’, in 
Randall Peerenboom et al. (eds.), Human Rights in Asia (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 487. 
10 John Gillespie and Albert H.Y. Chen (eds.), Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A Comparison of 
Asian Communist Regimes (London: Routledge, 2010).  
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conceptual apparatus developed in Part I.  
 
I A conceptual framework for the study of the achievement of 
constitutionalism 
 The modern idea of a written “constitution” for a nation-state came to fruition in 
the late eighteenth century in the course of the American and French Revolutions, the 
English constitutional instruments promulgated during the revolutionary upheavals of 
the seventeenth century being precursors of the modern constitutions.11 The very 
meaning of the word “constitution” was transformed. As Sartori points out, although 
this word has been used to translate the term “politeía” in Aristotle’s works, “politeía 
only conveys the idea of the way in which a polity is patterned”,12 while the modern 
meaning of the word “constitution” refers to “a frame of political society, organized 
through and by the law, for the purpose of restraining arbitrary power”.13 In the 
pre-modern era the word “constitution” or its equivalent in other European languages 
was “a descriptive, not a prescriptive, term”,14 referring to “the situation of a country 
as determined by a number of factors such as its geography, its climate, its population, 
its laws etc”, or “the state of a country as determined by its basic legal structure”.15 
“[T]he ancient idea of the constitution expressed the health and strength of the 
nation”.16 
 What is new and distinctive about the modern idea of a constitution is that it is 
conceived as a fundamental written law which simultaneously establishes the 
governmental system of a state and regulates the exercise of political power within the 
system. In other words, the constitution constitutes the state and its government. The 
government derives its legitimacy and authority from the constitution. But who makes 
the constitution? The answer provided by eighteenth century thinkers,17 influenced by 
the social contract philosophy of the seventeenth century and the Age of 
Enlightenment, is that it is “the people” – the people of the nation-state – who are the 
makers of the constitution, acting directly or through their representatives in a 
                                                   
11 An example of such documents is the Instrument of Government (1654) promulgated under 
Cromwell’s rule. See Grimm, ‘Types of constitutions’, p. 101. Grimm also points out (at p. 101) that 
‘After the Glorious Revolution in 1688, “constitution” in the singular gained ground and meant the 
basic rules concerning the government.’ The constitutional documents of the British colonies in North 
America (including the colonial charters granted by the Crown and the Fundamental Orders of 
Connecticut (1639)) are also examples of the earliest constitutions: see Karl Loewenstein, Political 
Power and the Governmental Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 132.   
12 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Constitutionalism: a preliminary discussion’ (1962) 56 (4) American Political 
Science Review 853 at 860 (italics in original). 
13 Ibid. (emphasis in original). 
14 Grimm, ‘Types of constitutions’, p. 100. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Martin Loughlin, ‘What is constitutionalism?’ in Dobner and Loughlin (eds.), Twilight of 
Constitutionalism, p. 47 at 48. 
17 The most important of whom include Thomas Paine and Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès. 
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constituent assembly. This is the theory of the constituent power, as distinguished 
from the government power which is constituted by the constitution. The exercise of 
the constituent power by the people is a manifestation of the sovereignty of the people, 
a fundamental concept that underlies most constitutions of modern times all over the 
world.    
 In terms of their substantive content, modern constitutions represent attempts by 
their draftsmen to design rationally a form of government that can best serve the 
objectives of the nation-state. As Loughlin puts it, their theorists “imagined a situation 
in which somehow the people would come together to reject their traditional 
constitutions, the products of ‘accident and force’, and would deliberate and devise a 
new framework of government from ‘reflection and choice’”.18 Influenced by 
liberalism, social contract theory and Enlightenment thought, and determined to put 
an end to the absolutism of the post-feudal state of the early modern era, the 
draftsmen of the first modern constitutions devised schemes of government for the 
purpose of minimising the possibility of abuse of political power, tyranny or 
oppression, and maximizing the protection of political freedom and the individual’s 
rights to life, liberty and property. Hence principles and institutions such as the Rule 
of Law, separation of powers, checks and balances, parliamentary elections and 
judicial independence were written into constitutions. Bills of rights19 were also 
promulgated to specify and catalogue citizens’ rights and freedoms which 
governments must respect.   
 After the birth of the first modern constitutions in the USA and France, the 
practice of constitution-making quickly spread throughout Europe in the course of the 
nineteenth century, and then all over the world in the course of the twentieth century. 
In today’s world, almost all countries (Britain being the most notable exception) have 
written constitutions. The possession of a constitution seems to have been accepted by 
all as a hallmark of the legitimacy of a nation-state and its regime for both domestic 
and external purposes. However, as Grimm has rightly pointed out, “once invented the 
constitution could be instrumentalized for purposes other than the original ones, 
adopted only in part or even as a mere form”.20 For political scientists and scholars of 
comparative constitutional law, therefore, the challenge is to understand and 
distinguish the different purposes or functions which constitutions have served,21 and 
the different kinds of constitutions or constitutionalism which have come into 
existence since the modern idea of the constitution was born in the late eighteenth 
                                                   
18 Loughlin, ‘What is constitutionalism?’, p. 48. 
19 Such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) and the Bill of Rights 
inserted into the Constitution of the USA in 1791. 
20 Grimm, ‘Types of constitutions’, p. 105. 
21 See, e.g., the discussion of the functions of constitutions in Saunder’s chapter in this volume.   
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century.      
 At the outset, a distinction may be drawn between what I would call “pristine” 
constitutions and “secondary” constitutions. Constitutions and constitutional thought 
first originated in Western civilization, and were then transplanted to societies and 
cultures in other parts of the world such as the Middle East, Asia and Africa. 
Constitutions in Western states may therefore be called pristine constitutions, and 
those in countries outside the orbit of the West called secondary constitutions. Since 
constitutions and constitutional practices evolved endogenously in some Western 
states and were quickly adopted by neighbouring Western states with similar social 
structures, economic circumstances and culture, it may be assumed that 
constitutionalism in its original form was more compatible with Western culture and 
social conditions than those of civilisations and societies to which the practice of 
having constitutions was subsequently exported. Pristine constitutions can therefore 
be expected to be more successful in practice than secondary constitutions. This is 
borne out by the phenomenon of “constitutions without constitutionalism” mentioned 
above in this chapter.   
 Unlike the earliest pristine constitutions, the first constitutions adopted by 
regimes in the non-Western world were not enacted after a revolution in order to 
constitute a new state and a new political order, nor inspired by the liberal doctrine of 
the protection of individuals’ rights against possible violations by the government. 
Instead, such secondary constitutions were designed to bolster the legitimacy of 
regimes threatened by Western powers and to enhance the effectiveness of their rule, 
although they did have the effect of modifying the existing political structure by 
introducing Western-style institutions such as parliaments and elections. Brown coins 
the term “politically enabling documents”22 to characterise such constitutions: instead 
of aiming at the limitation and control of government, they were promulgated by the 
existing regime to enable itself to be more legitimate and more effective, and thus 
more capable of survival when faced with domestic and external challenges. 
Examples include the Ottoman Empire’s constitution of 1876, the Egyptian 
constitution of 1882, and the constitution promulgated by the Meiji Emperor of Japan 
in 1889. The Qing Empire in China also attempted to move towards a constitutional 
monarchy in the early twentieth century, but was overthrown by the 1911 Revolution 
before the constitutional reforms could materialise.   
 The Meiji Constitution was modelled on the Prussian Constitution of 1850.23 
Although the movement of constitution-making engulfed European states – as well as 
                                                   
22 Nathan J. Brown, ‘Regime reinventing themselves: Constitutional development in the Arab world’, 
in Saïd Amir Arjomand (ed.), Constitutionalism and Political Reconstruction (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 
47 at pp. 49, 67. 
23 Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law (London: Butterworths, 1992), p. 28. 
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the newly independent states in Latin America -- in the nineteenth century, there was 
not yet a uniform practice of enshrining citizens’ rights in constitutions, which were 
primarily documents defining the structure of government and the division of powers 
between various state organs. For example, neither the Bismarkian federal 
constitution of Germany enacted in 1871 nor the 1875 constitution of the Third 
Republic in France included a bill of rights.24 And the achievement of 
constitutionalism in Europe in the nineteenth century suffered reversals and setbacks 
in the course of the twentieth century, with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 
1917 and the rise of Nazism and Fascism in Germany and Italy. Ultimately, the terror 
and atrocities of the Second World War prompted deeper reflections on 
constitutionalism, what it requires and how it can be sustained. As a result, what has 
been termed the “post-War constitutional paradigm” came into existence,25 in which 
respect for human dignity and equality came to be recognised as the core value of the 
modern constitutional state. This paradigm was exemplified by the German Basic 
Law of 1949, which affirms the inviolability of human dignity, declares the basic 
principles of the liberal democratic order and the basic rights of individuals, and 
establishes a Federal Constitutional Court exercising the power of judicial review as 
guardian of the constitution and the “objective value order” affirmed by it.26   
 The end of the Second World War and the decolonization of Asia and Africa that 
followed gave rise to many new states in the international community. The exercise of 
constitution-making proved to be extremely useful for the founders of the new states. 
Constitutions declare their newly acquired sovereignty and independence, and serve 
as a symbol of nationhood and the unity and collective identity of the people of the 
new state. This wave of constitution-making is an illustration of “constitutional 
learning” at work.27 The idea of a “constitution”, which indigenous leaders of the 
colonised peoples had learnt from the metropolitan powers, was now used to put an 
end to colonialism and to proclaim the independence, liberation and empowerment of 
a new political community, whose territorial boundaries were in many cases those 
carved out by the former colonial powers struggling against one another. But the 
widespread adoption of the “Western” practice of constitution-making by newly 
independent states in Asia and Africa does not necessarily mean that the new 
constitutions were intended to serve the same functions and purposes as the “pristine 
constitutions” (as defined above) or the contemporary “post-War constitutional 
paradigm” (as defined above) in the Western world, such as the legal limitation of 
                                                   
24 See the discussion in Loewenstein, Political Power, pp. 142-3. 
25 Lorraine E. Weinrib, ‘The postwar paradigm and American exceptionalism’, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), 
The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 84.  
26 See Weinrib, ibid. 
27 For constitutional learning theory, see David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, ‘The evolution and ideology 
of global constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 (5) California Law Review 1163 at 1173-1175.  
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state power, checks and balances among state organs, and the defence of citizens’ 
rights against the state.  
 Consider, for example, the cases of the Middle East and Africa. In the Middle 
East, constitutions were made in the new states that were created, some after World 
War I and some after World War II. Their common features included strong executives, 
weak parliaments and weak courts.28 Some introduced single-party systems.29 As 
Brown observes: “the constitutions of independence generally established some 
democratic and liberal forms of government while depriving them of any tools to 
operate effectively. … Elections were mandated in presidential systems but voters 
presented with a single choice determined by a stacked parliament. In monarchical 
systems, the king retained tools that allowed him to override or ignore elected 
parliaments.”30 Starting from the 1950s, another wave of constitution-making swept 
the Arab states in the Middle East as new revolutionary regimes opposed to Western 
liberal values (which were now associated with imperialism) gained power. New 
national charters and constitutions were introduced which embodied the new ideology 
of the states.31 “Egypt led the way in this regard, issuing a ‘National Charter’ after 
embarking on an ‘Arab socialist’ path in 1962; this was followed by a provisional 
constitution two years later.”32 The anti-liberal-democratic orientation of Arab 
constitutional patterns was to be reversed in more recent times, particularly after the 
US-led invasion of Iraq and the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other 
parts of the Middle East.33   
 In Sub-Saharan African, there was also a trend of reaction against Western-style 
liberal-democratic constitutions soon after independence. For example, Kwame 
Nkrumah, founding father of Ghana as sub-Saharan Africa’s first independent state, 
criticised the independence constitutions – usually modelled on those of the former 
colonial masters -- as being intended for “the preservation of imperial interests in the 
newly emergent state”.34 Other African leaders such as Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere and 
Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta were also critics of Western constitutionalism.35 Faced with 
                                                   
28 Brown, ‘Regime reinventing themselves’, p. 53. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Brown, ‘Regime reinventing themselves’, p. 54. 
31 Ibid., pp. 54-5. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See, e.g., Adeed Dawisha, The Second Arab Awakening (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013). For 
constitutionalism in the Middle East, see also Chibli Mallat, ‘On the specificity of Middle Eastern 
constitutionalism’ (2006) 38 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 13; Raja Bahlul, ‘Is 
constitutionalism compatible with Islam?’ in Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo (eds.), The Rule of Law: 
History, Theory and Criticism (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 515. 
34 H. Kwasi Prempeh, ‘Africa’s “constitutionalism revival”: False start or new dawn?” (2007) 5 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 469 at 473. 
35 Ibid., at 481. 
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“the twin challenges of nation building and socioeconomic development”,36 African 
governments rationalised authoritarianism or even explicit constitutional endorsement 
of a one-party state as a political system appropriate for the conditions of their 
countries; they also preferred socialism to capitalism.37 “Between 1960 and 1962 
thirteen newly independent African states, beginning with Ghana, amended or 
replaced their independence constitutions.”38 It was only after three decades of failure 
in economic development that African countries turned again to liberal constitutional 
democracy. In the 1990s, as the “third wave” of democratisation swept the globe, 
constitutional reforms were introduced in many African states to enable multi-party 
elections and constitutional transfers of political power to take place, and they have 
indeed taken place. Civil liberties have been expanded, and the courts have taken on a 
more active role in enforcing the rights provisions in the constitutional texts.39        
 Given the diversity of constitutional trajectories and experience among countries 
in different parts of the world, the question arises as to how their constitutions and 
legal-political practices relating to constitutions may be studied, analysed and 
classified. In the following, I will attempt to outline a conceptual framework for doing 
so, drawing on the brief historical survey above and the classifications of constitutions 
developed by Loewenstein and Sartori.    
 Loewenstein develops “a new approach to the classification of constitutions” 
which he calls the “ontological” classification.40 “The ontological approach, instead 
of analyzing substance and content, focuses on the concordance of the reality of the 
power process with the norms of the constitution.”41 Lowenstein thus distinguishes 
between three types of constitutions: normative, nominal and semantic. Using a simile, 
he suggests that a normative constitution “is like a suit that fits and that is actually 
worn”; a nominal constitution is like a suit which “for the time being, hangs in the 
closet, to be worn when the national body politic has grown into it”; in the case of a 
semantic constitution, “the suit is not an honest suit at all; it is merely a cloak or a 
fancy dress.”42 The meaning of the classification may be further elaborated as 
follows. 
 In Loewenstein’s view, “A constitution is what power holders and power 
addressees make of it in practical application.”43 A normative constitution is “a living 
                                                   
36 Ibid., at 475. 
37 Ibid., at 475-477. 
38 Ibid., at 474. 
39 See generally Prempeh, ‘Africa’s “constitutionalism revival”’. See also Charles Manga Fombad, 
‘Constitutional reforms and constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections on some current challenges and 
future prospects’ (2011) 59 Buffalo Law Review 1007. 
40 Loewenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process, p. 147. 
41 Ibid., pp. 147-148. 
42 Ibid., pp. 148-150. 
43 Ibid., p. 148. 
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constitution”, one that is “real and effective”, “faithfully observed by all concerned”, 
and “actually governing the dynamics of the power process instead of being governed 
by it.”44 A nominal constitution is one “that is not lived up to in practice”,45 because 
the “existing socioeconomic conditions” militate against its implementation, “but the 
hope exists, supported by the will of power holders and power addressees, that sooner 
or later the reality of the power process will conform to the blueprint. The primary 
objective of the nominal constitution is educational, with the goal, in the near or 
distant future, of becoming fully normative”.46 The nominal constitution is said to 
have “its natural habitat in states where western democratic constitutionalism has 
been implanted into a colonial or feudal-agrarian social order”.47 Loewenstein 
believes that “The novices in constitutional government in Asia and Africa will have 
to pass through an extended apprenticeship in the nominal constitution before they 
can graduate to constitutional normativism.”48 
As regards the semantic constitution, Lowenstein defines it as one that “is fully 
applied and activated, but its ontological reality is nothing but the formalization of the 
existing location of political power for the exclusive benefit of the actual power 
holders”.49 “Instead of serving for the limitation of political power, it has become the 
tool for the stabilization and perpetuation of the grip of the factual power holders on 
the community. The peaceful, non-revolutionary change in the location of political 
power is impossible.”50 Loewenstein considers the constitution of the Soviet Union to 
be an example of the semantic constitution.51  
If we apply Lowenstein’s classification, then the pristine constitutions that 
evolved endogenously in the Western world, and the constitutions of liberal 
democratic states in the world today, may be regarded as normative constitutions, 
while contemporary communist states’ constitutions that explicitly affirm and justify 
the communist party’s monopoly of power would fall into the category of semantic 
constitutions. Indeed, as Grimm points out, such “socialist constitutions”, together 
with constitutions of theocratic regimes, stand apart from other constitutions in the 
contemporary world in the sense that their legitimating principle is a 
“supra-individual absolute truth” rather than based on values of individual autonomy, 
pluralism and consensus.52 In the socialist constitution, the communist party’s 
“position is legitimized by superior insight in the ultimate aim of history and the true 
                                                   
44 Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
45 Ibid., p. 148. 
46 Ibid., p. 149. 
47 Ibid., p. 151. 
48 Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
49 Ibid., p. 149. 
50 Ibid., p. 150. 
51 Ibid., p. 152. 
52 Grimm, ‘Types of constitutions’, p. 114. 
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interest of the people”.53 In practice “the Communist Party is the sole authoritative 
interpreter of the Constitution and the laws. The Constitution rather assists the 
government in achieving the pre-existing purpose of political rule. … The question is 
therefore whether it is justified to regard these constitutions as a type of 
constitutionalism. If the measure is what was called here the achievement of 
constitutionalism, all essential characteristics of constitutions are missing.”54 
Lowenstein’s concept of the nominal constitution is more problematic. The 
nominal constitution as understood by Lowenstein is not merely a constitution that is 
not fully implemented and effective (because the “existing socioeconomic condition – 
for example, lack of political education and training, absence of an independent 
middle class, and other factors – militate” against its implementation55); it is one that 
has the “hope” of being effective at some future point in time.56 What is the basis of 
this hope? Loewenstein seems to ground this hope in “the will of power holders and 
power addressees”57 whom he describes as “novices in constitutional government in 
Asia and Africa” going through “an extended apprenticeship in the nominal 
constitution”.58 However, this seems to assume too much good will on the part of 
rulers of states with nominal constitutions. History shows that many of these rulers 
were simply interested in maintaining their power and perpetuating their rule, just as 
in the case of rulers under Loewenstein’s semantic constitutions. And many of these 
rulers (of states with nominal constitutions) did not themselves share Loewenstein’s 
belief that it would be in the interest of the people of the states under their rule to 
practise Western-style liberal democracy in accordance with a normative constitution, 
because, for example, they believed that authoritarian rule would better facilitate 
economic development, or that the indigenous culture and values are such that 
Western-style liberal democracy would be counter-productive in terms of political 
stability and social order.    
Bearing in mind these problems in Loewenstein’s classification, we now turn to 
examine Sartori’s classification of constitutions. Although Sartori wrote that he 
“agree[d] very much (in substance, even though not in terminology) with”59 
Loewenstein’s scheme, his own threefold classification consists of the “garantiste 
constitution (constitution, proper)”, the “nominal constitution”, and the “façade 
                                                   
53 Ibid., p. 128. 
54 Ibid., p. 129. 
55 Loewenstein, Political Power, p. 149. Loewenstein also points out (at p. 148) that ‘a constitution 
requires a national climate conducive to its realization. The tradition of autocratic processes must have 
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56 Ibid., p. 149. 
57 Ibid., p. 149. 
58 Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
59 Sartori, ‘Constitutionalism: a preliminary discussion’, at 861. 
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constitution (or fake constitution)”.  Sartori’s “garantiste constitution” is equivalent 
to Loewenstein’s normative constitution; such a constitution fulfils what Sartori 
considers to be “the purpose, the telos, of English, American and European 
constitutionalism”, which “could be expressed and synthesized by just one word: the 
French (and Italian) term garantisme”.60 “[A]ll over the Western area people 
requested, or cherished, ‘the constitution,’ because this term meant to them a 
fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional 
arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a ‘limited 
government.’”61 As regards Sartori’s “nominal constitution”, he acknowledges that 
this refers to “the constitutions that Loewenstein labels ‘semantic’ (a difficult, and 
perhaps not quite appropriate labeling).”62 They are “collection[s] of rules which 
organize but do not restrain the exercise of political power in a given polity. … They 
frankly describe a system of limitless, unchecked power. They are not a dead letter. It 
is only that this letter is irrelevant to the telos of constitutionalism.”63 
 What is most significant for our present purposes is Sartori’s concept of the 
“façade constitution (or fake constitution)”. Façade constitutions “take the appearance 
of ‘true constitutions’” but “are disregarded (at least in their essential garantiste 
features). Actually they are ‘trap-constitutions.’ As far as the techniques of liberty and 
the rights of the power addressees are concerned, they are a dead letter”.64 As 
mentioned above, Loewenstein has suggested that the objective of what he calls a 
“nominal constitution” is “educational, with the goal … of becoming fully 
normative”.65 In discussing the “façade constitution”, Sartori expressly rejects the 
view that the façade constitution or “fake constitution has an educational purpose. It 
may turn out that it has an educational effect. But this is a very different matter. We 
are not historians dealing with past events and looking for their a posteriori 
justification.”66  
 For Sartori, the main difference between what he calls “nominal constitutions” 
and “façade constitutions” is that whereas the former “actually describe the working 
of the political system” (though “they do not abide by the telos of constitutionalism”) 
and are in this sense “sincere reports”, the latter “give us no reliable information about 
the real governmental process” and are “basically a disguise”.67 However, Sartori 
also recognizes that “[t]here is often a considerable overlapping between nominal and 
                                                   
60 Ibid. at 855. 
61 Ibid. at 855. 
62 Ibid. at 861. 
63 Ibid. at 861. 
64 Ibid. at 861. 
65 Loewenstein, Political Power, p. 149. 
66 Sartori, ‘Constitutionalism’, at 861 (emphasis in original). 
67 Ibid. at 861. 
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façade constitutions”, and there exists “ ‘a mixed type’ (partly nominal and partly fake) 
of pseudo-constitution”.68   
 A comparison between Loewenstein’s “nominal constitution” and Sartori’s 
“façade constitution” may be useful at this point. Both constitutions consist of texts 
which are consistent with the normative project of constitutionalism. They are 
therefore likely to be liberal-democratic in orientation, providing for what Sartori calls 
the “techniques of liberty” such as separation of powers, checks and balances, 
protection of human rights, periodic elections to parliaments and top governmental 
offices, peaceful transfer of power in accordance with electoral outcomes, the Rule of 
Law and judicial independence. And both are constitutions which are not fully put 
into practice in the countries to which they are legally applicable.  
Examples of such non-implementation of the constitution might include: the 
government and its bureaucracy is weak and has no capacity to enforce the law across 
the country; the rights recognised in the constitution are not realised in any 
meaningful way and are worth no more than paper; constitutional institutions such as 
legislatures and courts are weak and are not able to exercise their constitutionally 
prescribed powers and functions in a practically significant or effective manner; there 
is no independent media, middle class or active civil society to monitor and promote 
the implementation of the constitution; political parties are weak and ineffective, and 
fail to operate constitutional mechanisms or processes available to them under the 
constitution; extra-constitutional forces such as the military do not abide by the 
constitution and may resort to coups; the existing powerholders have no commitment 
to the constitution and manipulate constitutional norms, institutions and processes for 
the purpose of staying in power, by, for example, rigging elections, buying votes, 
illegitimately controlling who may be candidates in elections, violating constitutional 
rights and human rights, using the law in a discriminatory manner to persecute 
political opponents, or otherwise denying political opponents a fair opportunity to 
compete for power on a level playing field in accordance with constitutional norms.  
It may be noted that some of the above examples (particularly those attributable 
to the incongruence between the actual sociopolitical conditions and environment of 
the country concerned and its constitutional norms) correspond to what Loewenstein 
says about “nominal constitutions”, while others (particularly those attributable to the 
lack of intention or will on the part of the powerholders to observe and implement the 
constitution faithfully) relate to what Sartori says about “façade constitutions”. Indeed, 
the key difference between Loewenstein’s “nominal constitutions” and Sartori’s 
“façade constitutions” appears to lie in the reasons why constitutional norms are not 
translated into reality. In Sartori’s case, the powerholders do not take them seriously; 
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hence the term “fake constitutions”. In Loewenstein’s case, the powerholders are 
making a genuine attempt to implement the constitution, though implementation is 
difficult because of the country’s socioeconomic conditions and political reality. 
Hence Loewenstein believes that there is still “hope”.      
I have in my previous works69 proposed a threefold classification of 
constitutionalism or of political, constitutional and legal practices relating to 
constitutions: “constitutionalism in its classical sense” (or “genuine constitutionalism”, 
abbreviated as GC); “Leninist-Stalinist forms of rule by a communist party-state 
legitimized by a written constitution defining the structure of the state and declaring 
the rights of citizens”70 or “communist/socialist constitutionalism” (abbreviated CC) 
(though it is doubtful whether this is a genuine form of constitutionalism); and 
“hybrid constitutionalism” (abbreviated HC) or “hybrid constitutional practices” 
(which is a concept analogous to that of “hybrid regimes” as theorised by political 
scientists71), “practised in states in which both elements of liberal constitutionalism 
and authoritarian elements that subvert or are inconsistent with such constitutionalism 
exist”.72 This scheme of classification may be mapped onto Loewenstein’s and 
Sartori’s schemes as follows. GC corresponds to Loewenstein’s “normative 
constitution” or Sartori’s “garantiste constitution”. CC would be based on what 
Loewenstein calls a “semantic constitution” or what Sartori calls a “nominal 
constitution”. And HC would embrace Loewenstein’s “nominal constitutions”, 
Sartori’s “façade constitutions” and Sartori’s “mixed type of pseudo-constitution”.  
This threefold classification of GC, CC and HC may provide the point of 
departure for a comparative study of political, legal and judicial practices relating to 
constitutions in different parts of the world. Such a comparative study should include 
a study of both the “statics” and “dynamics” of constitutions and constitutionalism. 
“Dynamics” here refers to constitutional change, development or evolution, including 
both progress and regression or degeneration -- notions which presuppose that GC (as 
compared to HC or CC) is the highest level of constitutionalism, corresponding to 
what Grimm calls the “achievement of constitutionalism”, and the fullest realisation 
of what Fuller calls the “morality of aspiration” as applied to the domain of politics 
and public law.  
The dynamics of constitutional development in a particular country’s history may 
be such that it moves from HC to GC (as the East Asian cases of South Korea, Taiwan 
                                                   
69 Chen, ‘Pathways of Western liberal constitutional development in Asia’, at 880; Albert H.Y. Chen, 
‘Constitutionalism and constitutional change in East and Southeast Asia: A historical and comparative 
overview’, in Albert H.Y. Chen and Tom Ginsburg (eds.), Public Law in East Asia (Ashgate, 2013), p. 
xv (Introduction) at xvi-xvii.  
70 Chen, ‘Pathways’ at 880. 
71 See Larry Diamond, ‘Thinking about hybrid regimes’ (2002) 13(2) Journal of Democracy 21. 
72 Chen, ‘Constitutionalism and constitutional change’, p. xvii. 
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and Indonesia have exemplified), or from CC to GC (as demonstrated in Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s). Lowenstein himself has contemplated the movement of Asian 
and African countries from “nominal constitutions” to “normative constitutions”, as 
well as the “gradual transition” in communist states “from a strictly semantic to a 
nominal or even a normative constitution”.73 More recently, scholars of Asian 
constitutional change have written about “transitional constitutionalism” (in countries 
such as South Korea and Taiwan which have undergone a transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy)74 and the idea of a “constitutional tipping point” (as 
applied to Southeast Asian countries), defined as “the point in the development of a 
constitutional order at which the political struggle for constitutionalism rapidly gives 
way to an entrenched constitutional culture and the constitution takes on a normative 
life of its own”.75   
In the contemporary world, GC is basically co-extensive with the political 
system of liberal democratic states in the West and in non-Western states which have 
successfully evolved into liberal democracy. The equivalence of GC with liberal 
democracy was not always the case in history, as the “achievement of 
constitutionalism” in Western states such as Britain, France and the USA preceded 
their democratisation to become states which practised universal and equal suffrage 
for all citizens. Nevertheless, in the early twenty-first century world, GC is indeed 
almost synonymous with liberal democracy. Furthermore, if we turn to the dynamics 
of constitutional development in the contemporary world, a transition from CC or HC 
to GC is in practice the same process as the transition of the country concerned from 
communist party rule or other forms of authoritarian, pseudo-democratic or 
semi-democratic governance into liberal democracy. The question therefore arises as 
regards what exactly is the province of the study of constitutionalism as compared to 
the study of liberal democracy and of democratisation in the contemporary world.   
The answer to this question would appear to lie in the distinction between the 
overlapping, but by no means identical, concepts of constitutionalism and democracy 
themselves. Democracy is about the self-government and self-determination of the 
people – people who consider themselves members of the same nation-state. It is also 
about electoral and voting systems that resolve differences of opinion by giving effect 
the will of the majority. Constitutionalism, on the hand, is concerned with what 
                                                   
73 Loewenstein, Political Power, pp. 151-153. 
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Sartori calls the design and operation of those “techniques of liberty” that are put into 
and used by the constitution for the purposes of constraining, controlling and 
regulating the exercise of political power by government, preventing power from 
being arbitrary or absolute, and safeguarding those fundamental rights and freedoms 
that derive from the human being’s personhood and human dignity. Constitutionalism 
is therefore concerned with matters such as separation of powers, checks and balances, 
legislative oversight of the executive, the Rule of Law, judicial independence, 
constitutional judicial review and human rights. Constitutionalism also provides the 
legal foundation for the operation of democracy, by stipulating electoral rules, 
protecting political rights to free speech, assembly and association, and regulating 
power transfer or succession of top powerholders.   
The study of constitutionalism in a particular country should therefore include 
matters such as the following: activities of constitution-making and constitutional 
amendment; constitutional litigation, the interpretation of the constitution by courts 
(or the constitutional court if such a court exists) and their exercise of the power of 
review of legislation or governmental actions (this subject is sometimes called “legal” 
or “judicial” constitutionalism76); the making of major laws relating to the 
implementation of the constitution; the exercise of powers by the legislature, 
particularly how it scrutinises the work of the government and ensures the 
accountability of the government (the operation of the legislature and the exercise of 
its constitutional functions are of particular interest from the perspective of “political 
constitutionalism”77) ; the use of the constitution and the institutions and processes 
established by it in the resolution of major conflicts between opposing political forces 
and in ensuring peaceful transfer or succession of power; public discourse, political 
activism and social struggles in the community which draw on the concepts, 
principles and rights enshrined in the constitution or any part of its text as resources to 
be used (these may be said to fall within the concept of “social constitutionalism”78). 
The degree of activities or activism in the above domains (“degree of constitutional 
activism”, abbreviated as DCA) would indicate to what extent the constitution is 
really “normative” (in Lowenstein’s sense), to what extent GC exists in the country 
concerned, to what extent there has been the “achievement of constitutionalism”, or to 
what extent there has been a movement from HC or CC to GC.  
The above discussion supplies a basic conceptual framework which may be used 
for the study of constitutional and related political and legal phenomena in the Asian 
                                                   
76 See generally Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
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‘Constitutional tipping points’, at 193-195. 
77 See Bellamy, ibid., Ramraj, ibid. at 195-197. 
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countries covered by this book. In the next part of this chapter, I shall attempt to 
provide an overview and general review of such Asian experience of constitutions and 
constitutionalism from a historical and comparative perspective, using the concepts of 
GC, CC, HC and DCA introduced above.    
 
II  The achievement of constitutionalism in Asia  
 
This book consists of country-based reviews of constitutional developments in 
sixteen Asian countries or jurisdictions, focusing in particular on developments since 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, together with three chapters (including the 
present chapter 1) which consider Asian constitutional trends more generally. The 
country studies include all countries or jurisdictions in East Asia (Japan, North and 
South Korea, the P.R.C., Taiwan, Hong Kong), most of the countries in Southeast Asia 
(Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and 
Indonesia), and two selected case studies from South Asia (India and Nepal). There is 
great ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity among these Asian societies. 
What they share in common is that they have all experienced, either directly or 
indirectly, Western imperialism and colonialism in their modern history, which have 
had a significant impacted on their constitutional and political developments.  
Southeast Asia (with the exception of Thailand) and India were colonised by 
Western powers and only became independent nation-states after World War II. Japan 
and China did not come under Western rule, but experienced respectively the Meiji 
reform and the 1911 revolution which initiated their modern constitutional trajectories. 
Taiwan and Korea came under Japanese rule at the end of the nineteenth century and 
at the beginning of the twentieth century respectively, which came to an end only after 
World War II. It appears that the geographical location and size of Asian countries has 
been a relevant factor affecting their political fates in modern times. The following 
discussion of Asian constitutional experience and pathways of development will 
therefore be organised geographically, starting with East Asia, then turning to 
mainland Southeast Asia, and then maritime Southeast Asia, and finally to South Asia. 
Actually, the order in which chapters in this book on the relevant countries and 
jurisdictions appear also follows these geographic divisions.  
Japan. Japan was the first Asian country to embark upon the project of 
constitutionalisation after it came into contact with the West. The political 
configuration of the feudal society under the Tokugawa shogunate was transformed by 
the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which established a strong and centralized system of 
government under the Meiji Emperor. The principal objective of the Meiji reform was 
to build a rich country and a strong military that could stand up to the Western 
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challenge. In response to an indigenous movement for constitutional reform, the Meiji 
Constitution was promulgated by the Emperor in 1889. The Japanese experience from 
the 1890s until the rise of a military government in the 1930s that practised a high 
degree of authoritarianism may be described as hybrid constitutionalism (HC). The 
constitution vested sovereignty in the Emperor instead of the people, but a parliament 
(the Imperial Diet) was established including a lower house which by 1925 was 
elected by universal manhood suffrage with competition among different political 
parties. A British-style practice of parliamentary government became to evolve. The 
constitution declared the rights and duties of subjects, though in practice civil and 
political rights were tightly restricted by law. The constitution did not require 
ministers appointed by the Emperor to be responsible to parliament. The Emperor and 
not the civilian government enjoyed the constitutional authority to command the 
military. 
 After World War II, the Meiji Constitution was amended to become a new 
constitution which affirms the sovereignty of the people (with the Emperor becoming 
a symbolic head of state), parliamentary government, human rights and judicial 
review. The distinctive feature of this 1946 Constitution is its article 9, the “pacifism” 
provision on the renunciation of war. With no single amendment since its enactment, 
this constitution is now one of the oldest surviving constitutions in the contemporary 
world. And it has been fully put into practice, providing a paradigmatic example of a 
country progressing from HC (under the Meiji Constitution, moving however to a 
completely “fake constitution” in Sartori’s sense in the 1930s) to GC, though doubt 
has been expressed as regards whether Japan would have achieved this transition 
“without the shock of losing the Pacific War and without massive Occupation support 
for Japan’s liberal forces”.79 Sakaguchi’s chapter in this volume discusses various 
attempts and proposals to amend the constitution, particularly article 9, partly 
motivated by the Liberal Democratic Party’s view that it was imposed on Japan while 
it was still under American occupation immediately after the War. In my view, these 
attempts demonstrate that the constitution has indeed been taken seriously in Japan. 
Sakaguchi also illustrates the roles of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (which he 
describes as a quasi-constitutional court) and the Supreme Court in interpreting the 
Japanese constitution. It seems that there is at least a moderate degree of 
constitutional activism (DCA) in contemporary Japan.        
Korea. In Korea, once a tributary state of China’s, the Chosen dynasty 
(1392-1910) came to an end with the Japanese annexation of Korea after Japan’s 
victories in its wars with China (1895) and Russia (1905). The Korean people 
                                                   
79 Lawrence W. Beer, Human Rights Constitutionalism in Japan and Asia (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 
2009), p. 168. 
19 
 
experienced colonial Japanese rule of a highly authoritarian nature until the end of 
World War II, when Korea became divided into the Republic of Korea in the South 
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the North. North Korea has been 
under one-man rule through a communist party – the Korean Workers’ Party – up to 
this day. Although the constitution is basically Stalinist in style and orientation, the 
legitimacy of the regime under Kim Jong-il and now Kim Jong-un is largely based on 
“dynastic succession” to Kim Il-sung, the founder of the regime. North Korea’s 
constitution and its various amendments exemplify what Lowenstein calls the 
“semantic constitution”, because they do provide information about the formal 
structure of the North Korean state and its ideology. Yoon’s chapter in this volume 
shows how successive changes to this constitution reveal the ideological evolution of 
the regime (such as the gradual de-emphasis on Marxism-Leninism and communism 
and the introduction of the indigenous ideology of Juche (self-reliance) and 
subsequently of Songun (military first), shifts in economic policy (from strict 
communism to a certain degree of openness to foreign investment), and modifications 
of the governmental structure (such as the increasing concentration of political power 
in the National Defence Commission and its chairman).      
 In contrast with the apparent political stability (at the cost of totalitarian 
repression) and “dynastic” continuity of North Korea, South Korea, which adopted a 
liberal democratic constitution in 1948, experienced four tumultuous decades and nine 
major constitutional revisions in its history, the last of which resulting in the 1987 
Constitution of the “Sixth Republic” which is currently in force. The varying patterns 
of constitutional and political practices in these four decades may be said to fall under 
the rubric of HC, with different mixes of democracy, constitutionalism and 
authoritarianism at different points in time. South Korea did experience rapid 
economic development under the strongman rule of President Park  
Chung-hee (1961-1979), who steered Korea’s rise as one of the “Four Little Dragons” 
of East Asia. In 1972, he proclaimed martial law and pushed through the Yushin 
Constitution, described by critics as “a constitution which legalized authoritarian 
rule”,80 inaugurating a “dark age” for constitutionalism in South Korea.81 Political 
instability engulfed South Korea after Park was assassinated in 1979, leading to the 
infamous Kwangju massacre of 1980. Fierce struggles by activists and civil society 
for democratisation finally won concessions from the military-led regime, resulting in 
the liberal democratic constitution of 1987 which introduced direct popular election of 
the president (in lieu of election by an electoral college) and established a new 
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constitutional court. Kim’s chapter in this volume provides ample evidence of the 
high DCA in South Korea today, including the debate on constitutional revision, and 
the emergence of the constitutional court as a key player in what Kim calls 
“mega-politics”. The chapter clearly shows that the process of democratic 
consolidation is alive and well in this new stronghold of GC in Asia.    
China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan). Compared to its neighbours Japan 
and South Korea, China (particularly mainland China after the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC)) has lagged behind in the achievement of 
constitutionalism. The PRC still practices CC today, although GC has now emerged in 
the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and on the island of Taiwan.  
During the last decade of its dynastic rule in China, the Qing court began to 
move towards a constitutional monarchy. An “Imperial Constitutional Outline” was 
promulgated in 1908, and provincial assemblies were elected. The 1911 Revolution 
overthrew the Qing Empire, and the Republic of China (RoC) was established in 1912 
with a liberal democratic provisional constitution. In the first one and a half decade of 
the republican era, several constitutions were promulgated or drafted by successive 
governments in Beijing, but none was effective as China was beset with warlordism 
and civil strife. In 1928, the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) under 
Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership succeeded to unify large parts of China (but not areas 
under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)) and established a new RoC 
government in Nanjing. The KMT adhered to the strategy of constitutional 
development advocated by its founder, Dr Sun Yat-sen, which involved a three-stage 
process of military government, political tutelage (under one-party rule in preparation 
for the third stage), and constitutional government. Using our terminology, this may 
be understood as a theory about establishing HC first and then moving towards GC. A 
provisional constitution for the period of political tutelage was promulgated in 1931 
which expressly vested power in the KMT. After the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 
1945, a new Constitution of the RoC, containing all key ingredients of a liberal 
constitutional democracy and establishing a constitutional court (consisting of the 
Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan), was adopted by a constituent assembly in 1946.  
This new constitution was not accepted by the CCP, and a civil war between the 
CCP and the KMT raged for several years, ending in the KMT’s defeat and the retreat 
of the RoC government to Taiwan, which had been ceded by the Qing Empire to 
Japan in 1895 and liberated from Japanese rule in 1945. During the civil war, the 
KMT regime introduced a constitutional amendment known as the “Temporary 
Provisions for the Period of National Mobilisation to Suppress the Communist 
Rebellion”, which expanded the emergency powers of the president. Martial law was 
decreed by the KMT government, first in the mainland and then in Taiwan. The civil 
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liberties and democratic elections promised by the 1946 Constitution were suspended 
by the RoC regime in Taiwan for nearly four decades, during which Taiwan under the 
strongman rule of Chiang Kai-shek and then his son Chiang Ching-kuo underwent 
rapid economic development and rose to become another of the “Four Little Dragons” 
of East Asia, together with South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. In this period, 
the constitutional court was operational, though not in such a manner as to challenge 
the government on politically sensitive matters. As time progressed, there was a 
considerable degree of social and even political pluralism, and elections took place at 
the municipal and county levels, as well as elections to a minority of seats in the 
Legislative Yuan. The constitutional and political practices of this period may be 
understood as falling within our concept of HC.   
Taiwan’s transition from HC to GC began with the lifting of the martial law 
decree by President Chiang Ching-kuo in 1987. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
Taiwan underwent rapid liberalisation and democratisation. The Temporary 
Provisions were repealed in 1991. Seven exercises of constitutional revision in 
1991-2005 substantially changed the nature and structure of the RoC state. A “silent 
revolution”82 was achieved in Taiwan. Multiparty elections were periodically held, 
leading to changes in government and transfers of power between political parties (the 
KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)) in 2000 and 2008. Since the late 
1980s, the constitutional court played an active role in declaring as unconstitutional 
the laws and regulations of the previous authoritarian regime. The constitutional 
amendment of 1999 was even declared unconstitutional and invalid by the 
constitutional court,83 invoking the jurisprudence that certain fundamental principles 
of the liberal democratic constitutional order ought to be protected against amendment 
or violation. As the chapter by Yeh and Chang in this volume demonstrates, in the first 
decade of this century, the constitutional court has played a more crucial role than 
ever before in adjudicating political conflicts arising from the circumstances of a 
“divided government” in which the presidency and government on the one hand and 
the Legislative Yuan on the other hand were controlled by different political parties 
(the DPP and the KMT respectively). The chapter also shows the high DCA in Taiwan, 
which, as in the case of South Korea, testifies to the vibrancy of the process of 
democratic consolidation.    
On the Chinese mainland, the first constitution of the PRC was enacted in 1954, 
largely modelled on the Stalinist constitution in 1936. China under Mao Zedong 
pursued a more “leftist” path than the USSR itself. The second constitution of the 
PRC -- the 1975 Constitution – codified the ideology of the Cultural Revolution era. 
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The 1978 Constitution marked the beginning of the retreat from Maoism, while the 
1982 Constitution laid the institutional and legal foundations for Deng Xiaoping’s era 
of “reform and opening”. This fourth constitution of the PRC is still in force today, 
subject to four sets of amendment introduced between 1988 and 2004. The 
amendments reflect the changing ideology and priorities of the CCP, which, despite 
radical changes in its policies of economic and social development, has continued to 
defend at all costs its monopoly of political power. The details of the 2004 
amendment are discussed in the chapter by Wang and Tu in this volume, which also 
covers other major legislative initiatives in the domain of Chinese constitutional law 
in the first decade of this century, and landmark events such as the Qi Yuling case and 
the Sun Zhigang incident. It is noteworthy that, as evidenced by the repeal in 2008 of 
the Supreme People’s Court’s landmark interpretation in 2001 in the Qi Yuling case, 
the regime has made it clear that Chinese courts have no role to play in interpreting 
and enforcing the Constitution. However, the Sun Zhigang incident of 2003 and 
subsequent developments in weiquan (“rights defence”) movements in Chinese civil 
society suggest that the concepts, principles and rights enshrined in the Chinese 
constitution have been increasingly used by litigants, activists and aggrieved persons 
to fight for justice and for the protection of their constitutional rights against 
violations by authorities. It may be said that there is a moderate DCA in China today.    
 The practice of “One Country, Two Systems” (OCTS) with regard to the 
autonomous Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau, established in 
1997 and 1999 respectively after the termination of British and Portuguese colonial 
rule, is an interesting feature of the existing constitutional order of the PRC. 
Constitutional developments relating to OCTS are briefly touched upon in the chapter 
by Wang and Tu in this volume, and discussed in greater detail in Chan’s chapter. In 
my assessment, although Hong Kong has not yet achieved full democratisation in the 
sense of the election of its Chief Executive and of all members of its Legislative 
Council by universal suffrage, its constitutional and political practices in the 
post-handover period may be considered as GC at work, with elements such as the 
Rule of Law, judicial independence, civil liberties, separation of powers, political 
checks and balances, as well as a free press and a vibrant civil society. In the first 
decade of this century, the struggles for the further democratisation of Hong Kong 
have brought about a high DCA in Hong Kong. It is to the PRC’s credit that even 
though its own constitution is one of CC, it has enacted and adhered to a Basic Law 
(of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) that has sustained GC in Hong 
Kong, the foundation of which was laid during the period of transition in 1984-1997 
(1984 being the year when the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong’s future 
was signed), when Hong Kong underwent a transition from HC (that was typical of 
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the authoritarian mode of British colonial rule in Asia and Africa) to GC.      
Vietnam. Traditional imperial rule in Vietnam, which had been influenced by 
Chinese Confucian civilisation, disintegrated as French colonisation proceeded in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Vietnam became part of French Indo-China, 
until it came under Japanese occupation during the Pacific War. After the war, the 
Vietnamese fought for independence from France. The French were defeated; the 
Geneva Agreement of 1954 recognised Vietnamese independence and partitioned it 
between North and South. War raged for many years between the two regimes, 
culminating in massive US intervention in the 1960s. In South Vietnam, the 1956 and 
1967 constitutions were liberal democratic in their texts. North Vietnam became 
communist, as clearly evidenced by its 1959 constitution which replaced the more 
liberal 1946 constitution. After South Vietnam was conquered by the North in 1975, a 
new constitution was adopted in 1980, which established CC in the newly unified 
state. As in the case of post-Mao China, Vietnam also embarked on the path of 
economic reform and liberalisation from totalitarianism when its communist party 
announced the doi moi (renovation) policy in 1986. The new constitution enacted in 
1992 affirms both human rights and property rights. In a manner reminiscent of the 
Chinese constitutional amendment of 1999, the 2001 constitutional amendment in 
Vietnam declares that Vietnam is a “law-governed socialist state”. Bui’s chapter in 
this volume provides an overview of constitutional developments in Vietnam since the 
beginning of this century, including the latest proposals for constitutional amendment 
which are expected to be adopted before the end of 2013. The chapter shows, for 
example, that despite the maintenance of one-party rule in contemporary Vietnam, 
more room has now been allowed for electoral competition among candidates for the 
National Assembly; the National Assembly has become more assertive in exercising 
its constitutional powers; constitutional provisions have been invoked in public 
discourse to challenge government policies or decisions; the communist party itself 
has recognised the legitimacy of concepts such as the limitation and control of state 
power. There appears therefore to be at least a moderate DCA in Vietnam. Whether 
the latest exercise of constitutional amendment will result in the creation of a 
constitutional court or a quasi-constitutional court remains to be seen. The case of 
Vietnam demonstrates that CC is capable of significant self-reform, possibly 
inaugurating a transition at least to HC, even if GC is still too remote to be 
contemplated.             
Cambodia. As recounted in Tan’s chapter in this volume, Cambodia became a 
French protectorate in 1863 with its traditional monarchy being preserved. Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk ascended the throne in 1941 with French support. After World 
War II, the French organised an election for a constituent assembly in 1946, which 
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adopted a constitution in 1947 modelled on that of the French Fourth Republic, 
though Cambodia was a monarchy under this constitution. Cambodia was granted full 
independence in 1953. Sihanouk ruled as a strongman in an authoritarian manner until 
he was ousted by a coup in 1970. Nine constitutional amendments were made before 
1970. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge came to power. An estimated one million people 
died during the communist reign of terror, which only ended with the Vietnamese 
invasion in 1979. With Vietnamese support, Hun Sen practiced strongman rule, with a 
communist constitution modelled on those of the USSR and Vietnam (or what we call 
CC). A civil war raged for years between Hun Sen’s government and a coalition of 
resistance forces including the Khmer Rouge and Royalists supporting Sihanouk. 
Internationally brokered ceasefire came with the Paris Peace Accord of 1991. The UN 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia oversaw the election of a new national assembly 
in 1993, which adopted a new constitution – drafted in accordance with liberal 
democratic guidelines laid down by the Paris Agreement -- re-establishing Cambodia 
as a constitutional monarchy. Since 1993, regular elections with multiparty 
competition have taken place, several constitutional amendments have been 
introduced, and a constitutional council was established in 1998 which has since 
exercised the power of constitutional review. Yet Hun Sen has survived the 
constitutional changes and continued to rule as strongman. Cambodia can probably be 
said to be in a state of HC.     
Thailand. Thailand’s constitutional story is also told in Tan’s chapter in this 
volume. Thailand is the only nation in Southeast Asia which has not been colonised 
by Western powers. Its constitutional practice, which began with the establishment of 
a constitutional monarchy in 1932, is therefore an entirely indigenous enterprise. Thai 
constitutional history is characterised by frequent oscillations between military and 
civilian rule, with recurring cycles of constitution-making, general election, formation 
of and rule by a constitutional civilian government, and then military coup. Seventeen 
constitutions, some provisional and some intended to be more permanent, have come 
and gone. There existed critical moments of popular protests changing the course of 
Thai political history, such as the students’ revolution of 1973, and the popular 
protests in Bangkok in 1992 which led to bloodshed and intervention by the highly 
respected King Bhumibol. As Tan points out in his chapter, the 1997 Constitution was 
hailed as Thailand’s most liberal and democratic constitution, and a “people’s 
constitution” enacted only after extensive public consultation. It established a 
constitutional court, which subsequently played a crucial role in Thai politics. Yet the 
great promises of this constitution were dashed when a military coup in 2006 toppled 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Although the military returned power to a 
civilian government elected under the new 2007 Constitution (which replaced the 
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interim constitution of 2006) that was approved by the people in a referendum, the 
political situation soon deteriorated with the continuous and violent confrontation 
between the anti-Thaksin “Yellow Shirts” and the pro-Thaksin “Red Shirts”. Political 
instability continued after the 2011 election by which Yingluck Shinawatra came to 
power, and she was eventually overthrown by a coup in 2014. Whether Thailand will 
finally grow out of its own brand of HC in which constitutional continuity is prone to 
be broken by coups remains to be seen.            
Myanmar (Burma). The Burmese kingdom was one of the most powerful states 
in Southeast Asia at the end of the eighteenth century, but weakened relative to the 
Thai and Vietnamese kingdoms in the nineteenth century. In 1886 Burma came under 
British rule. It became part of British India, but was constituted a separate colony in 
the 1930s, with a new colonial constitution enacted in 1935. As pointed out in Tan’s 
chapter in this volume, the British allowed the Burmese to practise parliamentary 
cabinet government in the 1930s. After the War, a constituent assembly was elected in 
which the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League, formed during the war with Japan 
and led by Aung San, won the majority of seats. A constitution was adopted in 1947, 
providing for a British-style parliamentary system and federalism, and Burma was 
granted independence in 1948. But as pointed out by Tan, Burma was beset by ethnic 
strife, secessionist movements, and civil war, and its civil service was weak. The 
experiments in parliamentary democracy finally came to an end with the military coup 
of 1962. The 1947 Constitution was set aside, and the military government ruled by 
decree for 12 years until a new “socialist” constitution for one-party rule was adopted 
in 1974. In 1988, popular demonstrations for democracy were suppressed and another 
military coup occurred. The new government set aside the 1974 Constitution, and held 
an election in 1990. Although the National League for Democracy led by Aung San 
Suu Kyi won a landslide victory, the government refused to hand over power and 
maintained authoritarian rule without even a “fake constitution” (in Sartori’s sense) 
for two decades. Finally, in 2008, a new constitution of the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar – the drafting of which actually started in 1993 -- was enacted and approved 
by a referendum, allowing multiparty elections but reserving a quarter of the seats in 
each house of parliament for the military. There have been signs of political 
liberalization more recently, with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest 
in 2010, and she and her party securing parliamentary seats in the 2012 by-elections. 
Thus Myanmar has moved from a state without even a “nominal” or “semantic” 
constitution (in Loewenstein’s sense) to the beginnings of HC.       
Malyasia. Like Burma, Malaysia also formed part of the British Empire in Asia, 
but its constitutional path after independence was much more stable and relatively 
successful. Shortly before Malaya acquired independence in 1957, a general election 
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was held in 1955 at which the Alliance led by the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO) first came to power. Malaya’s independence constitution was 
drafted by a commission led by Lord Reid from Britain, and provided for a 
British-style parliamentary system, a federal structure and a constitutional monarchy. 
In 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was formed by the addition of three new states to 
the Federation of Malaya. (One of them, Singapore, was ejected from the federation in 
1965.) The Alliance, subsequently known as Barisan Nasional (BN), has been 
continuously in power since independence through victories in parliamentary 
elections, although, as emphasised by Lee in his chapter in this volume, the opposition 
made considerable gains in the 2008 election which led to BN losing the two-thirds 
parliamentary majority that is required for any constitutional amendment. Since the 
independence constitution was made, fifty amendments have been introduced, the 
trend of which was to concentrate more power on the executive. A watershed event in 
Malaysian history was the 1969 racial riots which led to a declaration of emergency 
and curtailment of civil liberties. Under the leadership of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who 
served as prime minister for successive terms in 1981-2003, Malaysia made good 
progress in economic development, but judicial independence suffered a severe blow 
in 1988 when the Lord President and two other Supreme Court judges were removed. 
Lee in his chapter points out that even today, public confidence in the judiciary has 
not been completely restored. He also discusses the politics of democratisation and 
Islamisation, and the role of the hereditary Malay rulers. There seems to be at least a 
moderate DCA in Malaysia. Constitutional and political practices in Malaysia may be 
classified as constituting HC or as being very close to GC, depending on how much 
weight one attaches to civil liberties, judicial independence and transfer of power as 
an electoral outcome.     
Singapore. There are considerable similarities between the constitutional 
trajectories of Malaysia and Singapore; the latter’s constitutional practices have been 
described by Thio as “communitarian constitutionalism”84 or “illiberal 
constitutionalism”.85 When Malaya became independent in 1957, Singapore was still 
a British colony. As in Malaya, elections had already been held in Singapore before it 
acquired independence. In the 1959 election, the People’s Action Party (PAP) led by 
Lee Kuan Yew came to power. As mentioned above, Singapore joined the new 
Federation of Malaysia in 1963, but became independent in 1965. Singapore’s 
constitution was in many ways similar to Malaysia’s, adopting the British 
parliamentary system and inheriting the English common law, but Singapore is a 
republic. The PAP has been continuously in power since independence through 
                                                   
84 See Thio’s chapter in this volume. 
85 Li-ann Thio, ‘Constitutionalism in illiberal polities’, in Rosenfeld and Sajó (eds.), Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Constitutional Law, p. 133. 
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victories in periodic elections, always (since 1968) controlling more than the 
two-thirds parliamentary majority required for constitutional amendment, nearly forty 
of which have been introduced as the government thought fit. Opposition candidates 
did compete in elections. As pointed out in Thio’s chapter in this volume, a significant 
development in the 2011 election was that an opposition party won a multi-member 
constituency for the first time. In that election, the PAP won 60% of the votes; thus a 
significant number of voters voted for non-PAP candidates. Thio also discusses the 
constitutional innovations introduced by the PAP regime over the years, including the 
creation of a popularly elected presidency, independent of the executive and 
exercising financial powers, and the introduction of nominated (non-popularly elected) 
members and non-constituency members of parliament (the latter being candidates 
from the opposition who failed to get elected). Thio points out that the Singapore 
courts prefer communitarian values (including the social goals of political stability, 
inter-racial harmony, and economic development) to Western concepts of the 
individual’s rights, and are relatively more conservative or deferential to the 
government than their Malaysian counterparts in the exercise of their powers of 
review of governmental actions and in interpreting rights provisions in the 
constitution. As in the case of Malaysia, I consider the case of Singapore to be one of 
HC or very close to GC, depending on how much weight we attach in our assessment 
to civil liberties, judicial activism and transfer of power as an electoral outcome.       
The Philippines. Whereas the constitutional foundation for Malaysia and 
Singapore was laid by the British, American influence was predominant in the case of 
the Philippines. Spanish colonisation of the Philippines began in the late sixteenth 
century. During the Spanish-American War, the Filipinos declared independence in 
1898 and proclaimed the establishment of the first republic in Asia. However, the 
Philippines came under U.S. rule in 1901. U.S. policy was to prepare the Philippines 
for independence as a liberal democratic state. A constitution modelled on the U.S. 
Constitution was enacted in 1935 for the Philippines Commonwealth as a territory 
which enjoyed autonomy under American sovereignty. The Philippines was taken 
over by the Japanese during the Pacific War. In 1946, it acquired independence with 
an American-style political system based on the 1935 constitution which remained in 
force. A 25-year experiment in liberal democracy came to an end in 1972 when 
Marcos (president since 1966) declared martial law. In 1973, a new constitution was 
enacted to replace the 1935 constitution. Marco’s authoritarian rule came to an end in 
the peaceful “People Power” revolution of 1986 which followed the presidential 
election in which Corazon Aquino, widow of the assassinated opposition politician 
Benigno Aquino, ran against Marcos. A new 1987 Constitution with strong liberal 
democratic features was enacted under Corazon Aquino’s presidency. Since then, 
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although periodic elections were held, political stability was occasionally threatened 
by popular unrests, attempted coups and secessionist struggles in the south. In 2001, 
President Estrada was ousted by another “People Power” protest, which led to the 
assumption of the presidency by Arroyo, then Vice-President. As discussed in 
Pangalangan’s chapter in this volume, Arroyo’s presidency (2001-2010) faced various 
challenges, including a legal challenge to the validity of her assumption of power, 
allegations of rigging of the 2004 election, impeachment attempts by Congress, and 
attempted coups. Pangalangan points out that Arroyo resorted to emergency powers 
four times, often in such a manner as to evade the checks-and-balances provided for 
in the constitution. The Supreme Court has been called upon to adjudicate various 
politically controversial issues, and has invalidated some of the impugned 
governmental actions. Pangalangan’s chapter shows that there is a high DCA in the 
Philippines, with political actors making use of constitutional and legal rules and 
institutions in their struggles against one another. It is at least a case of HC, and may 
be regarded as approximating GC except that the record of “People Power” 
revolutions and attempted coups would militate against GC.      
Indonesia. Like the Philippines, Indonesia also experienced authoritarian 
strongman rule preceded and followed by attempts to practise liberal democracy, 
except that the period of strongman rule in Indonesia was much longer. Dutch 
colonisation of what is today Indonesia began in the mid eighteenth century. After the 
Pacific War, the indigenous Indonesians fought against the Dutch for independence. 
The Dutch were defeated and at the Hague Conference of 1949, the independence of 
Indonesia as a republic was recognised. Earlier, in 1945, an independence constitution 
had been promulgated, which expressed Soekarno’s “Pancasila” ideology and was 
also based on Soepomo’s concept of the integralist or organic state (as opposed to 
individualism and liberalism). The new 1950 Constitution established a parliamentary 
system, and the first general election was held in 1955 in which 16 political parties 
secured parliamentary seats. However, Soekarno declared martial law in 1957 and 
restored the 1945 Constitution. His authoritarian rule continued until 1965, when a 
coup occurred during which an estimated half a million people were massacred in an 
anti-communist drive. General Soeharto came to power and established a “New Order” 
regime with guaranteed participation of the military in the political system (dwifungsi). 
As pointed out by Hosen in his chapter in this volume, in the New Order regime only 
three political parties were allowed to participate in elections which were generally 
stage-managed. Soeharto’s rule finally came to an end in 1998 when Indonesia was 
badly hurt by the Asian financial crisis and there was civil unrest. Civil liberties were 
restored, and in 1999 the first free election since 1955 was held in which 48 political 
parties participated. As discussed by Hosen in his chapter, the newly elected national 
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assembly enacted a series of constitutional amendments in 1999-2002 which 
transformed Indonesia into a liberal democratic constitutional state. Since then, direct 
presidential elections have been successfully held in 2004 and 2009, with the 2004 
election resulting in a peaceful transfer of power (to Yudhoyono as president). The 
Constitutional Court established in 2003 has built up a reasonably good record in 
reviewing and invalidating laws and in adjudicating election disputes. Human rights 
protection has been strengthened, and, as pointed out by Hosen, civil and political 
rights in Indonesia have been highly evaluated by Freedom House relative to other 
Southeast Asian countries. Indonesia as the most populous Muslim state in the 
contemporary world is now also one of the world’s most populous democracies. 
Hosen observes that key political actors in Indonesia are committed to resolving their 
disputes non-violently through constitutional processes; Indonesia may be able to 
provide a model for other countries of the reconciliation of Islam with constitutional 
democracy. Thus Indonesia seems to be an important and revealing case of transition 
from HC to GC in Asia, though with only two recent presidential elections by 
universal suffrage on the record, whether democratic consolidation has occurred is yet 
to be observed.                 
India. The Mogul Empire was in existence in India when the English East India 
Company began its activities in India in the seventeenth century. In 1858, the British 
Raj in India was established as the British government assumed full responsibility for 
the governance of India and Parliament enacted the Government of India Act 1858. 
The last constitutional document enacted by the British Parliament for India before its 
independence was the Government of India Act 1935. Before independence, elections 
to the Indian legislature had already been introduced, and political parties such as the 
Indian National Congress and the Muslim League had already been in existence. In 
1947 the British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act, providing for the 
creation of India and Pakistan, each having its own constituent assembly for making 
its constitution. In 1949, the Constitution of India was adopted. This lengthy 
395-article constitution inherited much of the content of the Government of India Act 
1935, and exhibited all the features of liberal constitutional democracy. India was 
given a federal structure and a parliamentary system of government at both the Union 
and state levels.  
The Indian constitution has undergone approximately a hundred amendments, 
some of which were introduced to override decisions of the Supreme Court which has 
been activist in exercising the power of constitutional review and has even developed 
a doctrine that it is beyond the competence of Parliament (acting by a two-thirds 
majority of each of its two houses) to amend constitutional provisions that pertain to 
its “basic structure”. As pointed out by Deva in his chapter in this volume, the 
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colonial experience has led to the internalisation by the Indian political elite of 
elements of the British constitutional tradition, and the constitutional norms of liberal 
democracy have been largely adhered to except for a short period in the mid 1970s 
(when prime minister Indira Gandhi proclaimed a state of emergency). Deva discusses 
particularly the activism of the Indian Supreme Court in what he calls “constitutional 
engagement at a micro level”. He explains that the dysfunctional response of the 
executive and the legislature in handling problems such as “governance gaps” and 
environmental pollution has created an opportunity for the judiciary to play a 
“hyper-active” role in such matters, but he also doubts whether the courts have the 
capacity to tackle these problems effectively. Overall speaking, the Indian judiciary is 
apparently not known for its effectiveness, as demonstrated by long delays in the 
judicial process and occasional corruption scandals. Nevertheless, given that India is a 
developing country with much poverty, huge social and economic inequalities, and 
tensions between groups divided along ethnic, religious and caste lines, its 
achievement in constitutionalism is indeed significant and may be regarded as a case 
of GC with a high DCA.        
Nepal. Last but not least, we turn to the case of Nepal, which, as demonstrated in 
Ghai’s chapter, is an interesting case of constitution-making during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century. The territory of what is today Nepal was first unified in 1768, 
inaugurating the Shah dynasty of kings which continued until Nepal became a 
republic in 2008. In the period 1864-1951, the Shah monarchs were no more than 
figureheads, and Nepal was ruled by the Rana dynasty which practised hereditary 
succession to the position of prime minster, the real powerholder. The first 
constitution in Nepali history was promulgated in 1948. Autocratic rule by the Rana 
family came to an end in 1951 with the restoration of power to the Shan monarch, 
King Tribhuwan, who ruled with the assistance of the developing political parties. In 
1959, under the reign of King Mahendra, a constitution based on the British 
parliamentary model was promulgated, pursuant to which the first multiparty election 
in Nepali history was held in 1960. However, conflict between the monarchy and 
parliamentary leaders soon led to the dissolution of parliament and absolutist rule by 
King Mahendra, who legitimised his rule by the 1962 Constitution, which established 
the “Panchayat” (council) system in which multiparty electoral competition was not 
allowed. In 1972 King Birendra ascended the throne. He maintained the Panchayat 
system which survived the referendum of 1980. However, in 1990 a popular revolt 
known as the “People’s Movement” (Jana Andolan) forced the king to give up the 
Panchayat system and to turn Nepal into a constitutional monarchy with multiparty 
parliamentary democracy. A new liberal democratic constitution was enacted in 1990, 
pursuant to which the general election of 1991 was held. Nevertheless, the practice of 
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parliamentary government failed to stabilise because one of the political parties, the 
“Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)”, began an armed rebellion against the 
government in 1996. The civil war only came to an end in 2006 with the signing of a 
Comprehensive Peace Accord, as discussed in Ghai’s chapter in this volume. Ghai 
also discusses the enactment of the interim constitution of 2007, the parliament’s 
decision in 2007 to abolish the monarchy, the election in 2008 of a constituent 
assembly to draft a new constitution, the difficult issues faced by the constitution 
makers, and the failure to agree on a new constitution by the deadline stipulated in the 
interim constitution. At the time of writing, another election was about to be held for a 
new constituent assembly to continue the task of constitution-making. It may 
therefore be seen that Nepal is still in an early stage of constitutional development. It 
has evolved a kind of HC which however had been threatened by a decade-long civil 
war. Apparently there now exists a commitment on the part of the political elite to 
move towards GC in future, and there has been a high DCA in recent years because of 
constitution-making activities.     
Conclusion. As Saunders points out in her chapter in this volume, although the 
existing literature on legal transplant focuses largely on private law, the development 
of constitutions and constitutional law in non-Western parts of the world such as Asia 
has also been a process of legal transplant, and thus faces the common problems and 
challenges faced by all legal transplants, in addition to those peculiar to the project of 
constitutionalism. Given the inherent difficulties of transposing a Western plant to 
Asian soil, the phenomenon or syndrome mentioned at the beginning of this chapter 
of “constitutions without constitutionalism” is by no means surprising. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the “achievement of constitutionalism” or the practice of 
“genuine constitutionalism” (GC) is a matter of degree, governed by what Fuller calls 
the morality of aspiration. The brief survey above in this chapter and the remainder of 
this book tell this story of the achievement of constitutionalism in Asia up to this day. 
Using the classification of GC, CC and HC developed in this chapter, the overall 
situation in the countries or jurisdictions studied in this book may be summarised as 
follows. In modern times, Western constitutional ideas and practices were introduced 
into Asia either by colonisation or as Asian civilisations came under the challenge of 
imperialism. Before World War II, forms of HC had begun to develop in Japan and 
China. After World War II, GC was soon established in Japan and newly independent 
India. Mainland China, North Korea and Vietnam came under the influence of CC. As 
Ginsburg implies in his chapter in this volume, the legal reforms and constitutional 
discourses in contemporary China and Vietnam demonstrate that their constitutions 
are by no means merely a “fake constitution” or “nominal constitution” (in Sartori’s 
classification). This suggests that the concept of CC may not be completely 
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satisfactory and adequate (insofar as it fails to distinguish between the case of North 
Korea on the one hand and those of China and Vietnam on the other hand), and 
elements of HC may also evolve within CC.  
HC is a broad concept which may be applied to most of the other countries 
covered by this book at various points in time. HC was practised in South Korea and 
Taiwan, both of which underwent a successful transition to GC since the second half 
of the 1980s. Malaysia and Singapore trod a stable and steady path of constitutional 
development since independence which I would describe as HC or close to GC, 
depending on how much weight we attach to civil liberties. Other Southeast Asian 
countries experienced varying degrees of instability in the course of their 
constitutional development. Among them, Indonesia may be regarded as a case of 
transition from HC to GC since the turn of the century. The Philippines since the 
democratisation of the 1980s is a case of HC approximating GC. HC in Thailand has 
been characterised by cycles of military coups and rule by democratically elected 
civilian politicians. The potential for GC under the current constitution exists. HC in 
Cambodia is conditioned by Hun Sen’s strongman rule. Myanmar has experienced 
significant periods of military rule without even a constitutional document, but is now 
moving in the direction of HC. Nepal, which has seen political instability and civil 
war in recent times but is now in the process of making a new constitution, may be 
classified as a case of HC with aspirations towards GC.   
Overall speaking, the achievement of constitutionalism in Asia since the end of 
World War II, and particularly since the 1980s, has been considerable and significant. 
Although some scholars associate the Western form of liberal constitutional 
democracy with imperialism and global capitalism,86 the historical evidence is that 
constitutionalism has appealed to Asian peoples in their struggles for emancipation 
and justice, and has also been embraced by the political elite in many Asian countries 
as a political order that is both morally legitimate and practically appropriate for local 
conditions. If progress is at all possible in human history, then the achievement of 
constitutionalism in the governance of human societies may be regarded as a 
significant element and sign of such progress. This book is a testimony to such 
progress in the context of Asian societies in search of a legitimate and viable means of 
their own governance. It shows that constitutionalism is still very much a work in 
progress in many parts of Asia, a goal, an ideal and an aspiration for and towards 
which many people, famous or anonymous, high or low, are working, toiling 
struggling or suffering. The “end of history”87 is not yet in sight.  
                                                   
86 See, e.g., James Tully, ‘The imperialism of modern constitutional democracy’, in Martin Loughlin 
and Neil Walker (eds.), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 315. 
87 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992).  
